Dilemas para a Implementação de Programas de Incentivo Atrelados a Desempenho em Segurança Pública
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21118/apgs.v12i4.6053Resumen
Este caso de ensino introduz dilemas enfrentados por um gestor público da área de segurança pública na tentativa de estabelecer um sistema de incentivo por bônus salarial. A atividade policial enfrenta inúmeras dificuldades. Além de restrições orçamentárias e resistências a uma atuação conjunta de diferentes forças policiais, o contexto da sociedade, com crises econômicas e desemprego, por exemplo, pode levar ao aumento dos índices de criminalidade, independente de aumento do esforço policial. Sendo assim, escolhas realizadas por gestores da área não são suficientes para atingir os resultados desejados nos indicadores finalísticos. A despeito disso, os desafios da área exigem ações gerenciais rápidas e inovadoras. Ao colocar os alunos no papel de um gestor recebem empossado em um governo estadual fictício, porém utilizando referências de experiências reais, este caso propõe uma série de reflexões sobre mensuração de desempenho, incentivos e governança no setor público.
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Cardoso, F. L. M. G., Cecchetto, F. R., Corrêa, J. S., & Souza, T. O. de. (2016). Homicides in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: an analysis of lethal violence. Ciencia & Saude Coletiva, 21(4), 1277–1288.
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Duarte, E. C., Garcia, L. P., Freitas, L. R. S. de, Mansano, N. H., Monteiro, R. A., & Ramalho, W. M. (2012). Ecological association between characteristics of the municipalities and the risk of homicide in adult males aged 20 to 39 in Brazil: 1999-2010. Ciencia & Saude Coletiva, 17(9), 2259–2268.
Frant, H. (1996). High-powered and low-powered incentives in the public sector. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 6(3), 365–381.
Heinrich, C. J., & Marschke, G. (2010). Incentives and their dynamics in public sector performance management systems. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 29(1), 183–208.
Hölmstrom, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. The Bell Journal of Economics, 74–91.
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991). Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. JL Econ. & Org., 7, 24.
Ingram, M. C., & Marchesini da Costa, M. (2017). A spatial analysis of homicide across Brazil’s municipalities. Homicide Studies, 21(2), 87–110.
Kandel, E., & Lazear, E. P. (1992). Peer pressure and partnerships. Journal of Political Economy, 100(4), 801–817.
Klijn, E.-H., Edelenbos, J., & Steijn, B. (2010). Trust in Governance Networks Its Impacts on Outcomes. Administration & Society, 42(2), 193–221.
Moynihan, D. P. (2006). What do we talk about when we talk about performance? Dialogue theory and performance budgeting. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 16(2), 151–168.
Nery, M. B., Peres, M. F. T., Cardia, N., Vicentin, D., & Adorno, S. (2012). Spatial regimes: dynamics of intentional homicides in the city of São Paulo between 2000 and 2008. Revista Panamericana de Salud Pública, 32(6), 405–412.
Payne, A. A., & Roberts, J. (2010). Government Oversight of Public Universities: Are Centralized Performance Schemes Related to Increased Quantity or Quality? The Review of Economics and Statistics, 92(1), 207–212.
Perry, J. L., Engbers, T. A., & Jun, S. Y. (2009). Back to the Future? Performance?Related Pay, Empirical Research, and the Perils of Persistence. Public Administration Review, 69(1), 39–51.
Pinto, R. F., & Do Carmo, M. S. (2016). The pacifying police units of the State of Rio de Janeiro (UPPs): Incremental innovation or police reform? Public Administration and Development, 36(2), 121–131.
Propper, C., & Wilson, D. (2003). The use and usefulness of performance measures in the public sector. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 19(2), 250–267.
Salamon, L. M. (2002). The tools of government: A guide to the new governance. Oxford University Press.
Saz-Carranza, A., & Ospina, S. M. (2010). The behavioral dimension of governing interorganizational goal-directed networks—Managing the unity-diversity tension. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, muq050.
Amirkhanyan, A. A. (2009). Collaborative performance measurement: Examining and explaining the prevalence of collaboration in state and local government contracts. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 19(3), 523–554.
Amorim, C. (2012). Comando vermelho: a história do crime organizado. Editora Best Seller.
Andrews, R., Boyne, G., Law, J., & Walker, R. (2011). Strategic management and public service performance. Springer.
Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2008). Collaborative governance in theory and practice. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18(4), 543–571.
Arias, E. D. (2013). The impacts of differential armed dominance of politics in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Studies in Comparative International Development, 48(3), 263–284.
Boyne, G. A. (2006). Public service performance: Perspectives on measurement and management. Cambridge University Press.
Bryson, J. M., Crosby, B. C., & Stone, M. M. (2015). Designing and implementing cross?sector collaborations: Needed and challenging. Public Administration Review, 75(5), 647–663.
Burgess, S., Propper, C., Ratto, M., & Tominey, E. (2017). Incentives in the public sector: Evidence from a government agency. The Economic Journal, 127(605), F117–F141.
Cabral, S. (2017). Reconciling conflicting policy objectives in public contracting: the enabling role of capabilities. Journal of Management Studies, 54(6), 823–853.
Cabral, S., Firpo, S., Marchesini da Costa, M., & Viotti, L. (2016). Avaliação do sistema de metas e acompanhamento dos resultados da segurança pública no estado do Rio de Janeiro (p. 19). São Paulo: Fundação Brava.
Caldeira, T. P., & Holston, J. (1999). Democracy and violence in Brazil. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 41(04), 691–729.
Cardoso, F. L. M. G., Cecchetto, F. R., Corrêa, J. S., & Souza, T. O. de. (2016). Homicides in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: an analysis of lethal violence. Ciencia & Saude Coletiva, 21(4), 1277–1288.
De Bruijn, H. (2002). Performance measurement in the public sector: strategies to cope with the risks of performance measurement. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 15(7), 578–594.
Duarte, E. C., Garcia, L. P., Freitas, L. R. S. de, Mansano, N. H., Monteiro, R. A., & Ramalho, W. M. (2012). Ecological association between characteristics of the municipalities and the risk of homicide in adult males aged 20 to 39 in Brazil: 1999-2010. Ciencia & Saude Coletiva, 17(9), 2259–2268.
Frant, H. (1996). High-powered and low-powered incentives in the public sector. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 6(3), 365–381.
Heinrich, C. J., & Marschke, G. (2010). Incentives and their dynamics in public sector performance management systems. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 29(1), 183–208.
Hölmstrom, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. The Bell Journal of Economics, 74–91.
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991). Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. JL Econ. & Org., 7, 24.
Ingram, M. C., & Marchesini da Costa, M. (2017). A spatial analysis of homicide across Brazil’s municipalities. Homicide Studies, 21(2), 87–110.
Kandel, E., & Lazear, E. P. (1992). Peer pressure and partnerships. Journal of Political Economy, 100(4), 801–817.
Klijn, E.-H., Edelenbos, J., & Steijn, B. (2010). Trust in Governance Networks Its Impacts on Outcomes. Administration & Society, 42(2), 193–221.
Moynihan, D. P. (2006). What do we talk about when we talk about performance? Dialogue theory and performance budgeting. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 16(2), 151–168.
Nery, M. B., Peres, M. F. T., Cardia, N., Vicentin, D., & Adorno, S. (2012). Spatial regimes: dynamics of intentional homicides in the city of São Paulo between 2000 and 2008. Revista Panamericana de Salud Pública, 32(6), 405–412.
Payne, A. A., & Roberts, J. (2010). Government Oversight of Public Universities: Are Centralized Performance Schemes Related to Increased Quantity or Quality? The Review of Economics and Statistics, 92(1), 207–212.
Perry, J. L., Engbers, T. A., & Jun, S. Y. (2009). Back to the Future? Performance?Related Pay, Empirical Research, and the Perils of Persistence. Public Administration Review, 69(1), 39–51.
Pinto, R. F., & Do Carmo, M. S. (2016). The pacifying police units of the State of Rio de Janeiro (UPPs): Incremental innovation or police reform? Public Administration and Development, 36(2), 121–131.
Propper, C., & Wilson, D. (2003). The use and usefulness of performance measures in the public sector. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 19(2), 250–267.
Salamon, L. M. (2002). The tools of government: A guide to the new governance. Oxford University Press.
Saz-Carranza, A., & Ospina, S. M. (2010). The behavioral dimension of governing interorganizational goal-directed networks—Managing the unity-diversity tension. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, muq050.
Publicado
2020-09-09
Cómo citar
Marchesini da Costa, M., Cabral, S., & Macchione Saes, P. (2020). Dilemas para a Implementação de Programas de Incentivo Atrelados a Desempenho em Segurança Pública. Revista De Administração Pública E Gestão Social, 12(4). https://doi.org/10.21118/apgs.v12i4.6053
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